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Ten years ago the term Eurocommunism 
had yet to be invented, but in the spring o f 
1968 an attem pt w as being m ade in 
Czechoslovakia to apply m any o f the ideas, 
about the political, econom ic and social 
qualities o f a pluralist, democratic socialist 
society which have since been labelled as 
‘Eurocommunism The term Prague Spring 
then became, as Eurocommunism is today, a 
convenient and popular way o f ref erring to a 
particular trend in the search for a form of 
socialism suited to the needs o f a modem 
industrialised society.
The points o f departure are, o f course, 
different. For the Czechoslovaks it was a 
matter o f reforming and restructuring the 
‘existing socialism ’ which had been built up 
on the Soviet model, into a type o f society 
adapted to the needs and aspirations o f the 
people of Czechoslovakia — ‘socialism with a 
human face’ . That phrase caught the popular 
imagination because, for the Czechs and 
Slovaks, it meant rejection o f the inhuman 
stalinism they had experienced, and for the 
people in the capitalist world it offered the 
hope that socialism could, after all, provide a 
better future. The fact that the attempt was 
being made in the only country of Eastern 
Europe where an advanced political and 
industrial structure had already existed 
under cap ita lism  w as o f  particu lar 
significance in that connection.
As Santiago Carrillo has written in his 
book Eurocommunism and the State,
“ The case o f Czechoslovakia presented itself 
so sharply precisely because Czechoslovakia 
had reached the level o f France, for instance, 
and w hat em erged in  1968 was the 
contradiction between a society with a more 
developed cultural, economic and political 
infrastructure than the political and social 
system which was administering it.”  (1) In 
those words Carrillo has summed up what 
the Prague Spring was really about. And if 
we are to understand the full significance o f 
the events o f 1968, both for Czechoslovakia 
and for the international working class 
movement, we need to examine how the 
contradiction to which he refers arose, what 
were its effects and how the 1968 movement 
intended to tackle it. This requires a brief 
excursion into history.
Czechoslovakia, at its tormation in 1918, 
already possessed' a strong industrial base, 
an d  a t r a d it io n  o f  w o rk in g  c la s s  
organisation. It emerged as a bourgeois 
democracy, dominated by Czech finance 
capital, which relied on the West. For the 
C zechs and S lovaks, the tw o m ain 
nationalities in this small country, the idea 
o f  independent n ation h ood  was all- 
im portant a fter centuries o f  foreign  
domination, although the Slovaks, in the 
economically under-developed part o f the
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Republic, suffered both national and social 
oppression at the hands o f the Czech 
bourgeoisie, and tensions also existed with 
the various national minorities.
Karel Bartosek, one o f the marxist 
historians who, in the 1960s, were taking a 
new, undogmatic look at the modern history 
o f the country, has written that the pre-war 
Czechoslovak Republic represented the 
bourgeois solution o f  the national question 
and that the Czech bourgeoisie held a 
‘spiritual hegem ony’ in the new state, 
founded on the agreement o f the majority o f 
the people. The Communist Party with its 
internationalist tradition never succeeded in 
breaking that hegemony, although in the 
social field it could muster mass support 
against the ills o f capitalism. It was only 
when the country was faced with the threat 
o f German fascism that the revolutionary 
movement was able to appear convincingly 
as the champion o f the national interest 
and o f a new, democratic form o f state.
By then, however, it was too late. The 
bourgeois national state was destroyed not 
by the progressive forces, but by Hitler and 
internal reaction. The struggle between the 
bourgeois and the revolutionary solutions 
had not been resolved. During the German 
occu pation  from  1939-1945, how ever, 
national combined with social oppression 
unified the resistance movement, extending 
its demands beyond the main objective o f 
liberation from the Nazis to include the 
demand for a new democratic order when 
victory was won. The resistance brought 
together workers, peasants, urban petty 
bourgeois, ‘ordinary people’ everywhere, 
whereas open support for the Nazi occupiers 
came from sections o f  the former ruling class
— the top civil servants, large landowners 
and finance capitalists — bringing about a 
new polarisation o f  the population. The 
people were determined that the catastrophe 
o f Munich and the German occupation 
should never be repeated, and given the 
geographical position o f  the country, the 
entry o f the Soviet Union into the war was a 
strong influence in deciding the national 
outlook and the nature of the anti-fascist 
movement. There was, as one writer has put 
it, a ‘popular anti-fascism’, not explicitly 
socialist in all cases, but comparable to the 
‘popular radicalism ’ existing in war-time 
Britain.
The communists were the main force 
leading the anti-fascist resistance on the 
home front in the latter stages o f the war. The 
b o u r g e o is -d e m o c r a t ic , n a t io n a l is t ic  
opposition to fascism, on the other hand, 
although it operated mainly from abroad, 
commanded considerable support within the 
country and was still a force to be reckoned 
with. But when the military situation left no 
doubt that Soviet, not Western forces would 
liberate the greater part o f  the country, the 
leaders o f  the ‘n a tion a l b ou rg eo is ie ’ , 
President Benes, and his government in 
London, had to abandon the idea o f simply 
transferring themselves back to Prague to 
install some kind o f improved version o f the 
pre-war order. So they went to Moscow early 
in 1945 to negotiate with the communist 
leadership.
The struggle to decide the character o f the 
new Czechoslovakia now entered its decisive 
phase. Previous accounts o f the period 
leading up to the formation o f the 1945 
coalition government and the establishment 
o f ‘People’s Democracy’ have either seen it 
all as dominated by orders from Stalin and 
the decisions taken by the war-time alliance 
at Y alta, backed by the presence o f the Soviet 
Army (socialism brought in on bayonets 
being the crudest version); or at the other 
extreme there is the orthodox communist 
version that magnifies the strength o f the 
communists in the resistance and insists 
that by their wise policies the Moscow 
leadership was able to impose its will on the 
bourgeois politicians.
These versions reduce everything to a fight 
for power, with little reference to past history 
or the balance o f forces as it developed 
among the people o f the country during the 
w a r .  W h e n , h o w e v e r ,  w e  view 
Czechoslovakia’s post-war revolution as 
Bartosek and like-minded historians do, that 
is, as a process in which the bourgeois and 
revolutionary forces are still contending for 
‘spiritual hegemony’ o f the nation, we can 
begin to understand the significance not 
only o f Czechoslovakia’s ‘special road to 
socialism ’ from 1945-48, but also the reasons 
for the great popular upsurge o f the Prague 
Spring. Moreover, there are, as we shall see, 
aspects o f this post-war development which 
have considerable relevance to the problems 
o f ‘Eurocommunism’.
Whatever the differences in the specific 
circumstances, Czechoslovakia in 1945 was,
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as are Italy, Spain, Portugal today, a country 
in crisis — political, social, econom ic and 
moral — where the issue o f  bourgeois or 
w orking class hegem ony w as still to be 
d e c id e d , w h ere  la rg e  s e c t io n s  o f  the 
population were aware o f  the need for 
stru ctu ra l ch a n g e , a n d  a lo n g s id e  the 
revolutionary vanguard there was a mass 
desire for radical, i f  not outright socialist 
policies; at the sam e time, the forces o f  the 
right, nationalistic, capitalist and religious, 
m aintained som e hold within the country 
and could receive support from  abroad.
H ow , th en , d id  the le ft m ovem en t, 
prim arily the C om m unist Party, handle the 
situation? First, it should be borne in mind 
that the presence o f  the Soviet A rm y was a 
very powerful factor, not only in term s o f 
power politics, but also in in fluencing public 
opinion. Bartosek notes that there was really 
very little interference by the Soviet forces in 
the internal affa irs o f  the country, and for the 
‘ interference’ in fighting and driv ing  out the 
Nazis the people were infinitely grateful. 
And this had been done by a socialist power.
The situation at the end o f  the war was, 
then, very favorable for (he w orking class 
movement to play a leading part in deciding 
the future. At the negotiations in M oscow , 
a n d  l a t e r  in S l o v a k i a ,  b e t w e e n  
representatives o f  the national bourgeoisie 
and the socialists and com m unists, the only 
coherent program  for a post-war govern  men! 
was put forward by the C om m unist Party. 
Bv providing for a multi-party coalition  and 
being restricted to short-term measures, the 
program offered the basis for agreem ent. The 
unifying objective was to defeat the Nazis — 
it was an anti-fascist program . The new 
rgeirne would not be the pre-M unich regime, 
it would be a people ’s dem ocracy  relying on 
new dem ocratic institutions. The property o f 
Nazi.-' and their collaborators would be 
confiscated, thereby en croach ing  on the 
capitalist structure. A new approach  to the 
national question recognised S lovak ia ’s 
equal status. The m ainstay o f  foreign policy 
would be a lliance with the Soviet Union. 
P en d in g  e le c t io n s  to a C on stitu en t 
A ssem bly, the political parties had equal 
representation in the governm ent. The key 
posts in this interim governm ent were given 
to com m unists and non-party specialists.
Bartosek describes the solution as a 
com prom ise between the com m unist and the 
Benes positions — it w as both anti-fascist
and nationalist, with the em phasis on the 
first. The balance o f  forces inclined to the 
side o f  the w orking class; the basis for an 
anti-capitalist revolution existed, but it 
would be a new type o f revolution, differing 
from the Russian. “The new ness” , he writes, 
‘was not, however, in the tem porary co­
operation with a section o f the bourgeoisie 
which the balance o f  forces im posed, it was 
in the structure o f  the revolutionary front o f  
workers, born in the fight against fascism , in 
which there were not on ly workers and a 
section o f  the farm ers, but also the urban 
m i d d l e  c l a s s e s ,  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  
adm inistrative and industrial apparatus 
and o f  the creative intelligentsia” . This anti­
fa sc is t  u n ity  o ffe red  a g re a t  h is to r ic  
opportunity to carry out socialist change by 
p ea ce fu l d e m o cra tic  m ean s wi th  the 
support o f  the m ajority o f  society.
So, as long ago as 1944-1.), long before the 
ideas o f  ‘ E urocom m unism ' or the Prague
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Spring had emerged, Czechoslovakia was 
poised to put into practice what appear to be 
very similar ideas.
The international situation played a big 
part here. The policy o f a national and 
democratic revolution supported by the 
national bourgeoisie , on w hich the 
communist approach was based at the time, 
was in accordance with Stalin's belief that it 
would be possible to continue the anti-Hitler 
coa lition  into the post-w ar period o f  
reconstruction. And agreement could be 
reached with the national bourgeoisie 
because Benes and his Czech Socialist Party, 
while adhering finnly to the system of 
parliamentary democracy, had already 
spoken during the war years about the 
nationalising of the key industries and 
introducing some measure o f economic 
p lan n in g . On foreign  po licy  all the 
negotiating parties were aware o f the 
inevitability o f accepting the Soviet power 
‘umbrella’ .
The coalition program was not a socialist 
program, and the communists were the most 
cautious about speaking o f socialism as an 
exp licit aim . Their leader, K lem ent 
Gottwald, defined the relationship within 
the coalition as follows: “ We cannot rule 
ourselves and they cannot rule alone. They 
cannot rule without us and we cannot rule 
without them. At the same time they less 
without us than we without them. What 
remains is to co-operate with the other 
political group which is forced to co-operate 
with us.”  (2) After the liberation in 1945, 
however, there was strong popular demand 
for rad ica l policies, particu larly  for 
nationalisation measures going beyond the 
provisions o f the program for taking over all 
com panies owned by G erm ans and 
collaborators, or where such people had sat 
on the boards o f management (which, in fact, 
took in thv. key industrial concerns, mines, 
finance and banking). Similarly, the land 
reform started with the confiscation o f land 
belonging to enemies and traitors, thereby 
breaking up the big estates and increasing 
the numbers o f small and middle farmers. 
The Communist Party was careful to present 
t h e s e  m e a s u r e s ,  a s  w e ll  a s  th e  
democratisation o f public life through local 
councils, works councils and workers’ 
representation on the management boards o f 
nationalised concerns, as part of the 
national and democratic revolution, not as
socialism but as ‘people’s democracy’. 
Economic planning, embodied in the Two 
Year Plan for Postwar Reconstruction, was 
also part o f this concept.
In 1946 the communists emerged from free 
elections with 38 per cent o f the vote, making 
them the largest single party. In this period, 
by their cautious policy, they won a 
commanding position as the party most 
determinedly working for the national 
interest. And a socio-economic formation 
had been estab lished  w hich  could, 
potentially, have developed into a new, 
democratic and non-Soviet type o f socialist 
society. There was a three-sector economy, 
nationalised, co-operative and private, 
managed by a combination o f planning and 
the m arket, a m ulti-party coa lition  
government, strong, united and independent 
trade unions, industrial democracy through 
works councils, a farm ing community 
favorably inclined to the agricultural 
policies, a high degree o f civil rights and 
freedoms, and, in foreign relations, no 
conflict with the Soviet Union which had 
withdrawn its troops from the country by the 
end of 1945. The society was strongly non­
capitalist in character, with only 5.8 per cent 
o f  the national incom e go in g  to the 
capitalists and estate owners at the close of 
1947.
The question whether or not this was a 
‘special road to socialism ’ , especially 
whether it was genuinely viewed as such by 
the Communist Party o f the day, has been 
much discussed. The dogmatic thinking 
which dominated Czechoslovak work on the 
period after 1948 clouded the issue for some 
time, but in the 1960s during the run up to the 
Prague Spring many writers took a new look 
at the experience. The term special road was 
certainly used at the time, even by Stalin (for 
instance, in an interview with British Labor 
MPs in 1946), and Klement Gottwald used it, 
too, as a road not via “ the dictatorship o f the 
proletariat and soviets” ; it would be a 
“ longer and more complicated road .... ” , but 
without bloodshed. But did the communists 
o f the day envisage a type o f socialism at the 
end o f the road differing from the Soviet 
model? The answer to this is not clear and, in 
any event, the crisis o f 1948 decided the 
matter otherwise.
This is not the place to discuss the nature of 
the events o f February 1948 which put a stop
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to C zechoslovakia ’s first venture towards 
dem ocratic socialism , except perhaps to say 
that, as so often in the country ’s history, 
international factors, in the shape o f the cold 
war, played a large part. The stali.nist regime 
was im posed and, with tragic consequences, 
held the country in its grip until 1968.
The experience o f  1945-48 was not lost, 
however. As M ichal Reim an, one o f  the 
younger generation o f  m arxist historians 
has written, despite all the shortcom ings and 
conflicts, and the incom pleteness, this 
alternative road can be seen “ as a distant 
prototype for som e o f  the considerations 
about the nature o f  a socia list order grow ing 
out o f  a peaceful revolution w hich now find a 
developed form  in m any o f  the conclusions o f 
fraternal parties in the W est” .
For those in C zechoslovakia  who were 
seeking a w ay out o f  the stultifying 
conditions o f N ovotny ’s neo-stalinist regimu, 
the days o f  the ‘special roa d ’ also served as a 
source. For the people at large those days 
tended to appear as ‘the good old days ’ , 
rather glorified in retrospect as, even more so 
for m any, were the years o f  the pre-war 
bourgeois Republic. Im portant, however, in
this respect w as the elem ent o f  continuity in 
the national history o f  the Czechs and 
Slovaks w hich had been broken by the 
im position o f  an alien system o f  society. The 
struggle for ‘spiritual hegem ony ’ remained 
to be resolved, but, as the Prague Spring was 
to dem onstrate am azingly, despite all that 
h ad  h a p p e n e d , the fo rce s  o f  gen u in e  
socialism  were trium phant and would have 
remained so i f  the Soviet U nion had not 
intervened.
The C zechoslovak m arxists who prepared, 
at least to som e extent, the theoretical basis 
for 1968 were able to assess in a more sober 
way than the public at large the experience o f 
the first post-w ar years, and they were also to 
pick up the threads o f  a trend existing in their 
own party from  its foundation. Carrillo has 
pointed out that ‘E urocom m unism ’ has its 
roots  fa r  b a ck  in the h is to ry  o f  the 
c o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  
C zechoslovak Party can claim  its part in 
this. A  leading figure from 1921, when the 
C om m unist Party won over the m ajority o f  
the Social D em ocratic Party, was the 
e x p e r ie n ce d  A u stro -M a rx is t  R oh u m il 
Smeral, w hose concept o f a dem ocratic 
workers’ governm ent was an attem pt to find
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a road to socialism suited to a West European 
type o f society. Although ‘Smeralism’ was 
anathematised after Lenin’s death as a 
rightwing deviation, the trend was not 
entirely suppressed. It cropped up again in
1934 in opposition to the sectarian policy of 
the Comintern, only to be rejected, although 
in face o f the fascist threat the Popular Fron t 
policy was adopted soon after, in 1935. 
Smeral was the first o f the Czechoslovak 
communists to formulate in 1939 to 1941 (he 
died in Moscow in 1941) the concept o f a 
democratic anti-fascist revolution and an 
anti-fascist national front as a possible 
starting point for democratic socialist 
advance after the war. In the resistance 
movement, too, there were groups and 
ind iv idu als who v isualised  post-w ar 
development along similar lines. In brieLone 
may say that although in its pre-war history 
the CPC was as subordinated as any other 
communist party to the dictates o f the 
Comintern, it carried within it the germs o f a 
more independent national trend which was 
never.quite extinguished.
When, after the election o f Alexander I)ubcek 
to the leadership o f the Communist Party in 
January 1968, the need for a program was 
urgently posed, there was, as we have seen, 
valuable experience to draw upon. Those 
who were studying these matters during the 
1960s were, o f course, also familiar with the 
works o f Gramsciv Togliatti and other 
creative marxist thinkers, and they produced 
some original works which provided a 
theoretical basis for the Action Program o f 
the Communist Party o f Czechoslovakia, 
published in April 1968. We may mention 
particularly the work o f an ‘interdisciplinary 
team’ headed by Radovan Richta and 
published under the title Civilisation at the 
Crossroads (3) which was, in its day, a 
unique attempt to tackle the problems of 
‘post-industrial society’ from a marxist 
standpoint, with special attention to the 
changes in the political, economic and social 
sp h e re s  w h ich  the s c ie n t i f ic  and  
technological revolution could and should 
bring about in a socialist Czechoslovakia.
Another team headed by Zdenek Mlynar, 
studied the political system o f socialism, and 
its book, The State and Society, inspired 
many o f the proposals for changing the 
political system in the direction of socialist 
democracy that are contained in the Action 
Program. The stifling o f these and other
critical and exploratory undertakings by 
Czechoslovak marxists which took place 
from 1969 onwards is a sad loss for creative 
marxism.
Essentially the Action Program was 
concerned with the first steps towards 
resolving the contradiction between the type 
o f society and the political and social system 
which was administering it, to which 
Carrillo referred. It was, as its name implies, 
a short-term program designed primarily to 
free the political and econom ic system from 
the worst aspects o f the old regime — to end 
censorship, to make the ruling party earn its 
‘leading role’ by reason not coercion, to make 
the trade unions and other organisations of 
the people independent o f party control, to 
introduce industrial democracy and to free 
the economy from the system o f rigid 
command planning. The program was not, 
therefore, a b lue-print for the future 
democratic socialist order, and questions 
such as the formation o f opposition parties 
(which has been the subject o f criticism from 
some quarters) had still to be resolved. 
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia’s Action 
Program was studied with lively interest by 
the socialist and communist parties in many 
countries because, in its underly ing 
assumptions, it was in line with the thinking 
o f those in the international communist 
movement who were, particularly since 1956, 
seeking an image o f socialism differing from 
the distorted Soviet model. Many o f these 
aims are summed up in a sentence from the 
program: “ Socialism cannot mean only 
liberation of the working people from the 
domination o f exploiting class relations, but 
must make more provisions for a fuller life of 
the person ality  than any bourgeois 
democracy.”
For the other countries o f  Eastern Europe 
this approach and the events o f the Prague 
Spring were o f revolutionary significance — 
for thinking people in all walks of life, 
workers and in tellectu a ls alike, they 
accorded with their own experience and 
aspirations (for instance, the experiences of 
Poland and Hungary in 1956 and later), for 
the leaders they represented a threat to the 
monopoly o f power. And it was, o f course, 
essentially that sense o f danger that led to 
the invasion o f August 1968 which was 
carefully timed to prevent the holding o f the 
Czechoslovak Party Congress at which the 
provisions of the Action Program would
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have been further developed in the direction 
o f socialist democracy.
For communist parties in the capitalist 
world, insofar as they were not so hide-bound 
by dogma as to support the ‘ fraternal aid' 
afforded to Czechoslovakia by the invading 
forces, the Prague Spring was, and remains, 
a source o f inspiration, while the shock of its 
crushing provided a stimulus for those 
seeking, or already starting to tread, their 
own roads to socialism. For the Spanish 
Party, writes S an tiago  C arrillo , “ the 
c u lm in a t in g  p o in t in w in n in g  ou r 
independence (from Moscow — M.S.) was the 
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1988” . (4) 
An Italian  view is g iven  by G iorgi 
Napolitano: “ Other facts arose (above all the 
e v e n ts  o f  C z e c h o s lo v a k ia )  w h ich  
dramatically forced on the PCI leadership 
the need to deepen and develop even further 
their own vision of socialism, o f the 
rela tion sh ip  between dem ocracy  and 
socialism, of the problems o f the socialist 
world and of the world wide revolutionary 
workers’ movement.”  (5)
In the ten years since August 1968 much 
has happened to advance the trends loosely 
described as ‘Eurocommunist’ — we have 
seen progress and setbacks in various 
countries of the capitalist West, while in 
Eastern Europe, too, there have been 
s t ir r in g s  (e .g . P o la n d  1970, e tc .) . 
Czechoslovakia has been ‘normalised’ , that 
is, an even more repressive system than 
existed in the 1960s has been imposed upon 
her in the name o f ‘saving socialism ’ . Rut the 
unresolved conflict remains, the tensions 
and frustrations are even greater and 
socialism is in even greater crisis than 
before. Yet the regime refuses to listen to the 
warnings issued by the signatories of 
Charter 77 that their course can only lead to 
catastrophe.
One lesson to be learnt from the history o f 
Czechoslovakia is that any attempt to force a 
society into a mould that is alien to it is 
bound to fail sooner or later, even when that 
mould is socialist in name. The experience o f 
the ‘special road’ in 1945-48 and again, in a 
new form, o f the Prague Spring,also refutes 
the argument that although there may be 
peaceful roads to socialism, the ultimate goal 
can only be one kind of socialism, the Soviet 
type — an argument used today by those who 
insist that ‘Eurocommunism’ is merely a 
tactic for arriving at the same goal.
And finally, the lesson for the countries o f 
the Eastern bloc is, as has been proved over 
and over again in Poland, Hungary and 
elsewhere, that one country cannot go it 
alone in breaking with the old order. Though 
their paths may differ in some respects and 
the solutions they seek will be adapted to the 
specia l needs o f  their countries, the 
progressive movements will have to act in 
some wav in concert. At present we can 
expect no more than exchanges o f ideas 
among the ‘dissident’ groups, and reports of 
a meeting between Czechoslovak spokes­
persons for Charter 77 and members o f the 
Polish Committee for Social Self Defence on 
the tenth anniversary o f August 1968 are an 
indication o f what may be happening.
As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, one 
thing is certain — a movement o f the Prague 
Spring type can never be repeated. 
After the purging o f the Communist Party, 
the deeds carried out in its name against the 
C z e c h o s l o v a k  p e o p l e ,  a n d  th e  
disillusionment among many sections o f the 
p o p u la t io n  w ith  a n y th in g  term ed  
communist, or even socialist, an advance 
cannot come from within the party again. 
Although in its crude sense a ‘return to 
capitalism’ is unlikely to be envisaged by 
any hut the most rabid anti-socialists (to 
return the means o f production to capitalist 
ownership does not come into consideration), 
it must be said that the old struggle for 
‘spiritual hegemony’ will have to be fought 
out anew. In that process people will 
undoubtedly turn again for inspiration to
1968. And socialists and communists in 
other countries can help enormously both by 
studying and developing the ideas o f 1968 
and, above all, by showing their solidarity 
with the groups in Eastern Europe which are 
seeking a new socialist solution for their 
countries.
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